The past 30 years has been marked by rapid growth in mandated employer contributions for social insurance programs in both the United States and abroad. Payroll taxation is a large and growing source of public finance in the United States: 38 percent of federal rev enues in 1993 were raised by payroll taxation while this figure was only 12.4 percent percent in 1960 (Economic Report of the President 1992 . This corresponds to a similar growth in the reliance on payroll taxation in other developed countries. For example, the payroll tax rate in Sweden grew from 6 percent in 1950 to 40 percent by the late 1970s (Holmlund 1983) . At the same time, employer-mandated provision of insurance benefits to workers has risen as well, through programs such as Workers' Compensation in the United States and maternity leave in both the United States and many other nations.
The growth in employer-financed social insurance programs has been criticized along a number of dimensions. Perhaps the most important criticism has been that payroll taxation and other mandates raise labor costs, thereby reducing competitiveness and leading to disemployment. This argument has found casual support in the high level of unemployment in Europe, where employer mandates have grown rapidly since 1960. Furthermore, payroll taxation and, in particular, lump-sum employer mandates have been labeled inequitable relative to broad-based income taxation.
The purpose of this chapter is to assess these criticisms of man dated employer contributions in the United States. This type of analy sis is particularly important now given the recent proposal to finance the largest social welfare program of the last 60 years, National Health 184 Gruber Insurance, through an employer mandate. In the debate over the wis dom of employer-mandate-financed health reform, the criticisms noted above have taken center stage. Furthermore, as I show below, payroll taxes represent the majority of the tax burden for over 80 percent of taxpayers in the United States, highlighting the importance of assess ing the efficacy of this particular mode of raising revenue.
I analyze payroll taxation and employer mandates in the United States in four steps. First, I present a brief overview of payroll tax financed and employer-mandated social insurance programs in the United States. Second, I discuss the basic theory and evidence on the labor-market effects of payroll taxes and employer mandates, high lighting the similarity between the two types of interventions. I note that while there is a growing body of reduced form literature, suggest ing that the costs of mandated benefits and payroll taxes can be shifted to wages, we still have not resolved the critical structural question of whether this shifting is due to full valuation of these benefits or inelas tic labor supply.
I then extend this basic analysis to consider a number of real world complications in analyzing the labor-market effects of these interven tions: minimum wage constraints on wage shifting; group-specific mandates which cause employer costs to rise significantly more for some types of workers than for others; and the fact that many mandates are a fixed cost of employment which may distort the margin of hours choice. Finally, I consider the efficiency and equity implications of shifting the financing of federal social insurance programs from the payroll tax to the income tax and of removing the current cap on earn ings subject to federal payroll taxation.
I conclude with two points. First, while we have learned much in recent years about the effects of payroll taxation and mandates on the labor market, there remain a number of important unanswered ques tions. Second, there is a critical gap in the empirical literature which makes it difficult to draw firm conclusions as to the overall efficacy of government interventions financed by payroll taxes and mandates: information on the benefits of these interventions for the affected par ties.
BACKGROUND ON PAYROLL TAX FINANCED AND MANDATED PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES' Payroll Tax Financed Programs
At the federal level, there are three major payroll tax financed pro grams. The first is Social Security (SS), which provides income sup port to workers upon their retirement (at age 62 or greater). 2 The program is "unfunded;" that is, the benefits paid to current retirees are financed by taxation of current workers. Social Security benefit levels are not a direct function of the taxes paid by a worker but rather of his or her earnings history; earnings in the highest 35 of the 40 earnings years from age 21 to age 60, relative to average earnings in the econ omy, are used to determine benefits levels. Earnings histories are then translated to benefits through a formula that, in effect, favors low wage workers.3 Benefits are paid as an annuity, yielding a fixed amount (in real terms) from the point of retirement until death.
Benefits to retirees are financed by equal payroll taxation of work ers and firms. Wages, salaries, and self-employment income are tax able; other forms of capital income, such as dividends, are not. Both sides of the payroll tax are capped at the "Social Security Taxable Maximum" earnings, so that the average tax burden is actually decreas ing with wages above this maximum. In recent years, payroll tax col lections have greatly exceeded benefit expenditures, with the difference being used to create a trust fund for financing the retirement of the baby boomers. This trust fund is projected to be insufficient to meet the needs of future cohorts, however, leading to recent proposals to slow the growth of Social Security benefits and/or raise tax rates. This highlights the importance of reconsidering the fundamental struc ture of social insurance financing.
The second federal payroll tax financed program is Disability Insurance (DI), which provides income benefits to workers who have become so disabled that they must leave the labor force. The structure and financing of DI is very similar to Social Security along a number of dimensions: individuals must have worked a minimum number of quarters, and benefits are based on past earning history. Unlike Social Security, however, there is no age restriction on the receipt of benefits. 186 Gruber The major restriction, instead, is that individuals be physically or men tally incapable of gainful employment. Disability is assessed in a com plicated (and highly imperfect) process, which begins with state examination boards and which can be ultimately appealed to the fed eral level. 4 The third program is Medicare, public health insurance for all per sons age 65 and above. Medicare consists of two parts. Part A finances the hospital expenditures of the elderly (along with some copayment by the elderly themselves). This part of Medicare is financed by a payroll tax similar to that of Social Security, levied equally on workers and firms. The Medicare payroll tax differs in two important respects from the Social Security payroll tax, however: it is much lower and, in recent years, the taxable maximum has greatly exceeded that for Social Security and the cap was removed altogether in 1994. The second part of Medicare, Part B, finances physician expenditures of the elderly. This portion of Medicare is financed by premium payments by elders and from general revenues. Table 1 presents the history of the tax rates and taxable maxima for the major federal payroll tax financed programs. There was a dramatic rise in both the tax rate and the taxable maximum from 1950 to 1980. Thereafter, both have continued to rise, but at a much slower pace (except for the Medicare taxable maximum, which again rose rapidly in recent years). The fraction of workers under the taxable maximum has remained relatively constant in recent years. The growth in the size of these programs is documented in Table 2 . Each program has grown very rapidly over time, although the growth of Medicare has recently been the fastest.
At the state level, the major payroll tax financed program is Unem ployment Insurance (UI), which provides limited income support to workers who lose their jobs. Qualification for UI is a function of statespecific minimum work requirements. Benefits are then paid to indi viduals who are laid off, but not (in most states) those who quit or are fired for cause. Benefits are a redistributive function of previous earn ings, with a minimum and maximum benefit and less than one for one conversion of wages to benefits in between, and are generally paid for 26 weeks. UI is financed by payroll taxation of employers, up to a tax able maximum of earnings.5 Employers tax rates are partially experi- Year 1960 Year 1970 Year 1975 Year 1980 Year 1981 Year 1982 Year 1983 Year 1984 Year 1985 Year 1986 Year 1987 Year 1988 Year 1989 Year 1990 Year 1991 Year 1992 Year 1993 Year 1950 Year 1960 Year 1970 Year 1975 Year 1980 Year 1981 Year 1982 Year 1983 Year 1984 Year 1985 Year 1986 Year 1987 Year 1988 Year 1989 Year 1990 SS ence rated as a function of previous layoff histories; see Anderson and Meyer (1993) for details. Table 3 presents details of UI payroll taxation in 1993 and histori cally. UI payroll tax rates, as measured by the maximum rate, are fairly high, reaching 10 percent in some states. The tax base, however, is fairly small. In 1993, many states had taxable maxima below $10,000 of earnings; for the federal FUTA tax, the base was only $7,000. The striking historical trend, particularly in comparison to Table 1 , is the falling coverage of the UI taxable wage base. In 1947, over 90 percent of wages were covered in most states; by 1990, many states' bases extended to less than 30 percent of payroll.
Employer Mandates for Employee Workplace Benefits6
Along with the payroll tax financed programs discussed above, employers in the United States also are mandated to provide a wide variety of benefits for their workers. Federal law explicitly mandates the provision of maternity leave to most employees in firms with more than 50 employees (under the Family and Medical Leave Act). While not requiring employers to offer health insurance, federal law regulates the structure of insurance for those firms that do offer coverage, man dating the inclusion of comprehensive maternity health insurance cov erage (under the 1978 Pregnancy Discrimination Act) and continuation of coverage benefits (under the 1986 Consolidated Omnibus Reconcili ation Act) in health insurance packages.7
State law in 48 states mandates that employers purchase workers' compensation (WC) insurance against workplace injuries. 8 Workers' compensation is the oldest and largest mandated benefit in the United States, with benefit payments amounting to $37 billion in 1990. This program pays both the medical bills of the injured worker and an indemnity benefit, which is a redistributive function of their pre-injury wage (the benefits structure is similar to that of UI). States legislate the level of benefits that must be paid to workers for a variety of different types of injuries. Firms can then purchase insurance from either the state or private firms to cover these costs or (in most states) they can self-insure. Workers' compensation insurance costs averaged 2.1 per cent of payroll in 1987, but there was a high variance. Table 4 , from Gruber and Krueger (1991) , shows the level and change in workers' compensation costs for the trucking industry from 1978 to 1987. 9 These costs grew dramatically during the 1980s, due both to rising medical costs and to changes in state benefits legislation, and costs were over 25 percent of payroll in some states in 1987.
States also mandate that employers include a number of particular benefits in their health insurance packages. There are over 1,000 such "state mandated benefits," covering benefits ranging from alcoholism treatment to in vitro fertilization (see Gruber [1994b] for details). In addition, several states mandate the provision of insurance to tempo rarily disabled workers. There are also a variety of mandates for mini mal levels of workplace safety at both the federal and state levels, in addition to the compensation for workplace accidents provided by WC. Figure 1 displays the standard diagrammatic analysis of the labormarket effects of payroll taxation levied on the firm. The market is ini tially in equilibrium at the intersection of the labor supply (S0) and demand (D0) curves, at the employment and wage package (L0,W0)-Payroll taxation of an amount T lowers the amount that the firm can pay for a given level of employment, shifting labor demand inward to Dj. This reduces the wage that workers are paid to W\, and employment falls to LI\ the tax has a deadweight loss equal to the area ABC. The difference L0 -LI represents the disemployment effect of payroll taxa tion highlighted by critics of this form of revenue raising. This analy sis applies equally well to a mandate that costs the employer a fraction 1 of wages (such as workers' compensation); this mandate raises the cost of hiring workers, shifting demand inward and leading to disem ployment. However, this basic tax incidence diagram misses an important feature of payroll taxes and mandates: tax/benefit linkages. Most of the payroll taxes described above, such as those for Social Security, disability insurance, and unemployment insurance, are financing bene fits to the workers who are taxed. Similarly, mandates such as that for maternity leave or workers' compensation are providing (potentially) valuable benefits to workers in the firms that are affected by the man date. This tax/benefit linkage is not perfect; for many workers, one more dollar of taxation does not represent one more dollar of benefits. The fact that such a linkage exists, however, affects this analysis. The key point is that, since some of taxes paid come back to the worker in the form of future benefits, the disemployment effects of payroll taxes will be reduced because workers will be more willing to accept lower wages.
This point is illustrated in Figure 1 . In the presence of tax/benefit linkages, workers are now receiving higher net compensation than in the pure tax case, because the tax is buying them some benefits. Work ers are therefore more willing to work for a given wage, shifting labor supply outward to Si . As a result, employment falls only to L^. That is, due to this tax/benefit linkage, there is a much smaller distortion from payroll taxation: the deadweight loss from taxation has been reduced from ABC to DBF.
The extent of the tax/benefit linkage will depend on the extent to which workers perceive that the taxes are returned to them as benefits. If every dollar of taxes paid were perceived by the worker to be return ing in benefits, this would not be viewed as a tax at all, and there would be no distortion. 10 This can be readily seen in the simple model used by Gruber and Krueger (1991) , for the case of a lump sum mandate. Suppose that labor demand (Ld) is given by:
(1) and that labor supply (Ls) is given by:
(2) 196 Gruber where C is the cost of the mandate, W is the wage rate, and ocC is the employee valuation of the mandated benefit. In equilibrium, the effect of the mandate on wages will be:
where T| D and T|s are the elasticities of demand for and supply of labor, respectively. It is clear from this equation that, if a = 1, there will be full shifting of the cost of the mandate to wages, and no effect on employment as a result. On the other hand, for a = 0, this expression simplifies to that for the incidence of a payroll tax in the absence of tax benefit linkages. The analysis would be similar for a marginal payroll tax rather than a lump sum mandate; in that case, a would measure the employee's valuation on the margin. There are two key points that must be noted in reference to this analysis and that of Summers (1989) . First, the general distinction between payroll taxes and mandates is a false one. The salient feature is not the form of revenue raising but the extent of tax/benefit linkages. In both cases, employers are paying some cost and employees are receiving some benefit. This point is made most starkly by contrasting Unemployment Insurance, a payroll tax financed benefit, with Work ers' Compensation, a mandated employer-provided benefit: in both cases, employers pay some fixed portion of their payroll to insure their workers. If the perceived benefits of working an additional hour under each program is the same, and the payroll cost to the employer for that hour is the same, these programs will have exactly the same effect on the labor market. Of course, in practice there are some important dif ferences, such as the fact that mandates are often lump sum while pay roll taxes are not (a point I return to below), but as a matter of general principle the two can be analyzed in a parallel manner.
Second, a key determinant of tax/benefit linkages for both man dates and payroll taxes will be the extent to which benefits are provided to both workers and nonworkers. If equal benefits are provided to nonworkers, then there is no linkage between taxes paid and benefits received, because individuals could have not worked and received the same benefit. This point is especially important when assessing the efficiency implications of financing National Health Insurance through an employer mandate. If, as seems politically likely, coverage is extended to the unemployed for free, or at least at a highly subsidized rate, it will mitigate any tax-benefit linkages for workers and may increase the efficiency cost of financing.
Evidence
Research on the incidence of payroll taxation has a long history. Early incidence research involved time-series studies of changes in payroll taxes in the United States and abroad. This research produced mixed results. Brittain (1972) reported that the payroll tax was fully shifted to wages, but his finding was criticized by Feldstein (1972) . Vroman (1974) found that 1/4 to 1/2 of the payroll tax was shifted to wages in United States manufacturing. Holmlund (1983) used the time-series data on payroll taxes in Sweden to study a period when the payroll tax increased from 14 to 40 percent and found that roughly 50 percent of the tax was shifted to wages in the short run. A different approach was pursued by Hamermesh (1979) , who used the variation in payroll tax rates due to the Social Security payroll tax limit to esti mate wage offsets. His estimates indicated that from 0 to 35 percent of the Social Security tax is shifted to wages.
This "first generation" of studies, however, generally suffered from being unable to control for important potential omitted variables. In the time-series studies, for example, there may have been unobserved economic trends that affected both wages and tax-setting institutions. What is needed to overcome these problems is variation in employer costs within arguably homogenous locations over time, so that both time and location omitted variables can be controlled for in the analy sis.
More recent research has attempted to follow this approach, using variation across U.S. states in the cost of employer mandates and pay roll taxes. Gruber and Krueger (1991) studied the incidence of work ers' compensation; as noted previously, even though a mandated benefit in name, workers' compensation is similar to a payroll tax for the purposes of incidence analysis. We model wage incidence by exploiting the large change in workers' compensation costs over time and across states in several high cost industries during the 1980s. Table 4 shows that this variation is quite sizeable in the trucking indus try. Using a large sample of workers in these industries from the Cur- 198 Gruber rent Population Survey, we find that 85 percent of this cost increase was shifted to wages. We are able to exactly replicate our micro-data findings using aggregate industry/state/year data on wages. Further more, using this source of data on employment, we find no significant employment decrease from these increases in workers' compensation cost. Anderson and Meyer (1997) focused on the incidence of the Unemployment Insurance payroll tax at both the market and firm level, using a very large dataset of individual UI wage records from several states. UI tax costs differ systematically across markets due to differ ences across states in the structure of the experience rating schedule. The costs also differ across firms due to different firm locations on that schedule (which imperfectly ties a firm's current tax rate to its past lay off experience). These tax costs have changed over time at both the state and firm level due to legislated changes in experience rating schedules. Anderson and Meyer found that there is full shifting of market level differences in UI costs but not full shifting of firm level differences. Thus, the more recent evidence, which uses legislative variation in payroll costs across states, seems to suggest that payroll taxes and mandates are fully shifted to wages.
What Can We Learn from the Empirical Work?
This new reduced form evidence, however, leaves an important structural question unanswered. In the simple labor-market framework above, there are two reasons why increased costs might be shifted to wages: because individuals value the benefits that they are getting fully or because labor supply is perfectly inelastic. 11 Disentangling these alternatives is very important for future policy analysis. Consider the example of national health insurance, which is financed by a mandate and an additional payroll tax to cover nonworkers. If full shifting is due to full employee valuation with a somewhat elastic labor supply, then national health insurance will have important disemployment effects because supply will not shift for a policy not restricted to work ers. If full shifting is driven by inelastic supply, however, then the pop ulation receiving benefits is irrelevant. In either case, the costs will be passed onto workers' wages, so national health insurance will not cause disemployment.
Payroll Taxes, Employer Mandates, and the Labor Market 199 There is no evidence which bears on this question in Gruber and Krueger (1991) . Anderson and Meyer (1997) provided some informa tion in their firm/market level distinction, but it is not enough to distin guish the two structural hypotheses. It seems likely that both the elasticity of labor supply between firms is higher than that between markets and that employees may not value the extra marginal cost to the firm from experience rating. Both of these structural interpreta tions would therefore be consistent with their finding. Evidence from elsewhere in the empirical labor economics literature suggests that the labor supply of prime age males is fairly inelastic, while the labor sup ply of secondary earners is somewhat more elastic, but there is consid erable uncertainty about the reliability of previous attempts to measure this crucial parameter (Heckman 1993) .
What is needed to convincingly disentangle these views is some variation in one or the other of these dimensions only. For example, is the incidence of employer mandates/payroll taxes significantly differ ent across groups with plausibly different elasticities of labor supply, such as married men and married women? Is there differential inci dence with respect to elements of a policy that are likely to be valuable, such as cash benefits for work injury, as opposed to elements that are less likely to be valued, such as insurance administrative loading fac tors?
There are two additional limitations in applying the reduced form results from past research to modeling the incidence of future govern ment interventions, or even the incidence of other programs. The first is that this research has examined the medium to long run incidence of the cost of mandates and payroll taxes. 12 The short run incidence is much more uncertain. It is often assumed that shifting to wages does not occur through nominal pay cuts but, rather, due to worker money illusion, through inflation erosion of the real wage. 13 There is little work addressing the important questions of whether incidence signifi cantly differs in the short and long run or whether it varies according to differences in the inflationary environment when the mandate is enacted.
Second, the extent of tax/benefit linkages may vary substantially across different interventions. National health insurance provided to nonworkers is one example of a program with no tax/benefit linkages so that the existing incidence studies may not be relevant; this is also 200 Gruber true for Medicare. For Social Security, the extent of tax/benefit linkage varies along a number of dimensions: it is lower for high wage earners due to the progressive manner in which earnings are converted to bene fits; it is lower (and often zero) for secondary earners because they receive the higher of their accrued benefit and 50 percent of their spouse's benefit so that often their earnings record is irrelevant; and it is zero for workers in the five lowest earning "dropout years," which are not used in benefits computation. Furthermore, the perceived tax/ benefit linkage may be weaker still because workers may not under stand that the "PICA" contribution on their pay stub is actually a form of retirement savings. The recently announced policy of informing workers as to their retirement savings entitlement under SS might serve to improve the efficiency of SS financing, to the extent that it increases perceived tax/benefit links. Future work which could cleverly incorpo rate these different kinds of linkages could ideally answer the structural question posed previously.
Equity
In interpreting the empirical work in this area, it is important to understand the goal of government policy. If the government is inter vening to correct a market failure and the payroll tax/mandate is simply a means of financing that intervention, then shifting to wages can be viewed as the "price" that is being paid for government provision of insurance. In the case of full valuation, perhaps due to adverse selec tion in the private insurance market, government mandates will be an efficient and equitable policy; the mandate is a perfect "benefits tax."
If the goal of a mandate is not to correct a market failure, however, but rather to provide benefits to some deprived group in society, then full shifting to wages may not be viewed as a desirable outcome. Rather, this may be viewed as the mandate being "undone" by the adjustment of wages. In this case, the additional deadweight loss from broad-based financing that does not have tax/benefit linkages may be a price that society is willing to pay in order to direct more resources towards one group. Thus, it is important to understand the goal of gov ernment mandate policy: is it to correct a market failure or to redirect resources across groups? 14 Payroll Taxes, Employer Mandates, and the Labor Market 201
THE MINIMUM WAGE
The analysis above assumed that firms could readily pass on their costs of taxation to workers in the form of lower wages. However, if workers are already earning the minimum wage, such "shifting to wages" is not possible. This is illustrated in Figure 2 , for the case where the minimum wage is equal to the equilibrium wage pre-tax. In this case, a tax on firms causes a much larger fall in employment because worker wages cannot be reduced, so that the net compensation cost to the firm has risen. Employment now falls to L2 and the pres ence of the minimum has increased the disemployment effects of taxes levied on firms. This disemployment effect is independent of the valu ation of the benefit by workers since equilibrium is determined on the demand side of the market; the shift in the supply curve to S\ has no effect on employment or wages.
How important is this effect quantitatively? Recent research (Card 1992a,b; Katz and Krueger 1992; has shown that changes in the minimum wage cause no significant decrease in employment and may actually cause increases. 15 There are two possi ble interpretations of these findings, both of which suggest that the minimum is a less important consideration for the incidence of employer taxation than is implied by Figure 2 .
The first, which takes the employment increase estimates seriously, is that the neoclassical model is not appropriate and that low-wage labor markets are more precisely described by a monopsony model. The effect of payroll taxation or mandates in such a model is shown in Figure 3 . Demand is described by curve D0, supply is curve SQ, and the marginal factor cost is curve MFC0. The competitive wage is Wc, and the competitive employment level is Lc ; the monopsony wage is Wm and the monopsony employment level is Lm. When a minimum wage is imposed at Wmm, employment rises for the monopsonist to Lmm. This is the positive employment effect estimated by some of these studies.
In such a model, a small mandate or payroll tax shifts demand to Dj. There is no effect on employment from this change; it is paid out of employer profits. Thus, a small mandate or payroll tax acts as a pure profits tax in this model. A larger policy change, however, can have real effects. If demand falls all the way to D2 (if the increased cost to 202 Gruber the employer is larger than the difference between the competitive wage and the minimum wage), then employment will fall to the same level as in the competitive case (L2). The employment change, how ever, will still be smaller than in the competitive case because some of the cost of the mandate has still been absorbed in profits. The second interpretation of the new minimum wage research is that it provides evidence of fairly inelastic labor demand in the low wage labor market. Indeed, even the traditional time series studies of the effects of the minimum wage suggested elasticities of demand as low as 0.1 (Brown, Gilroy, and Kohen 1982) . In this case, once again, the minimum will not cause mandates to have significant disemployment effects, as the cost primarily is paid from profits or prices. So, under either interpretation, the "new" minimum wage research sug gests that the minimum wage may not be an important impediment to the shifting of mandate costs to wages.
GROUP-SPECIFIC MANDATES

Analytical Framework
The previous analysis has highlighted the parallels between employer mandates and payroll taxation. However, there are many important differences between these two forms of regulation in prac tice. The first is that, unlike payroll taxes, which are generally uniform across all workers, mandates may cause employer costs to rise signifi cantly more for one group of workers than for another. This can arise, for example, because the mandate is explicitly group specific, as in the case of maternity leave legislation. Alternatively, it can arise due to experience rating in private insurance markets, which raises the costs of insuring some workers above the costs of others. For example, man dated workers' compensation insurance in an experience-rated firm costs much more for a very accident-prone worker than for a safe one. Similarly, mandated health insurance costs significantly more for sicker workers, as well as for married workers and those with large families. Such problems could arise with payroll taxation in theory, but payroll tax costs rarely vary by worker characteristic. 16 204 Gruber Group-specific differences in costs may complicate the analysis of a mandate's effects. If the group that benefits from the mandate (group A) fully values the intervention at the cost to the employer and if employers are able to shift those costs to group-specific wages, then there will be no effect of the mandate on either that group or on other groups (group B). That is, for group A, the analysis will be the same as above; since the employer costs have not changed for group A, there is no spillover onto other segments of the market. 17
There may, however, be a number of barriers to full group-specific shifting not present in this simple model. Most obviously, there are antidiscrimination regulations that prohibit differential pay for the same job across groups or that prevent differential promotion decisions by demographic characteristic. 18 Furthermore, workplace "norms," which prohibit different pay across groups, or union rules about equal ity of relative pay may have similar effects as antidiscrimination rules. These will not be important considerations for workplace-wide man dates or payroll taxation.
Barriers to group-specific adjustment operate in exactly the same fashion as the previously discussed minimum wage effects for the group benefiting from the'mandate. Returning to the competitive model, there will be disemployment of group A if there are such barri ers because wages cannot adjust to offset the new employer costs. As a result, if there is some substitutability between groups A and B, employers will substitute towards group B. Fears of group-specific disemployment were at the heart of the debate over mandated mater nity leave-since the cost of employing women of child-bearing age would rise, opponents claimed that employers would discriminate against this group in hiring. Thus, even with full valuation and no explicit regulatory barrier such as the minimum wage, there can be a distortion from a group-specific mandate.
Previous Evidence
Evidence on the incidence of a group-specific mandate is provided in Gruber (1994a) . In that paper, I studied the effects of state and fed eral mandates that employers include comprehensive coverage for maternity in their health insurance plans. A commonly accepted fea ture of health insurance benefits before the mid 1970s was limited cov-erage for childbirth. Maternity coverage was sometimes excluded from basic health benefits; if included, it was often subject to flat rate cash amount limits, regardless of the cost of delivery. This differential coverage was widely perceived as discriminatory (Leshin 1981; Alan Guttmacher Institute 1987) . Many states responded to this perception in the 1975-1978 period by passing laws prohibiting treating preg nancy differently from "comparable illnesses" in health insurance ben efits. Then, in October 1978, the Federal Government passed the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA), which prohibited any differen tial treatment of pregnancy in the employment relationship.
These laws affected a readily identifiable group, women of childbearing age and their husbands (under whose insurance these women may have been covered), so that I was able to study the impact of these laws based on observable characteristics. They were also fairly costly for these individuals, due both to the widespread existence of differen tial maternity benefits before 1978 and the large fraction of health insurance costs which are accounted for by maternity benefits for women of child-bearing age. I found that there was full group-specific shifting: the wages of the affected groups fell by enough to offset the cost of the mandate to their employers. As a result, there was no effect on their net labor supply. Since women are generally modeled as hav ing much more elastic labor supply than men, the fact that there was full shifting for this group is suggestive that such shifting arose from movements in the supply curve and not from demand shifts along an inelastic supply curve.
Further evidence on this point is provided by Olson (1993) , who examined the wages and health insurance coverage of single men, rela tive to single women and married males, during the era that saw increased incidence of AIDS. Olson did find a significant narrowing of the positive wage gap between single men and single women over this era, although he found no effect on the relative wages of single and married men. He also found that there was a drop in employer-pro vided health insurance for single men relative to both control groups. 19
This work suggests that employers can shift mandated costs to the wages of demographically identifiable groups within the workplace. However, it leaves unanswered the important question of how finely employers can shift mandated increases in benefits costs. Did the shift ing estimated in Gruber (1994a) arise from reduced average wages in 206 Gruber firms with a high proportion of women of child-bearing age or from shifts in the wage structure within the workplace? In the latter case, how finely can the wage structure be manipulated to shift group-spe cific costs? The extent to which within-workplace shifting is possible is an important question for analyzing employer-mandated national health insurance. In a small firm with one very sick worker and, as a result, very high medical costs, it will almost certainly be impossible to shift these high costs to the wages of that single worker. As a result, it will be in the firm's interest to discriminate in the hiring of sick work ers. On the other hand, an entire workplace of sick workers could pre sumably be paid less to compensate for employer insurance costs differences. How large does the group of sick workers have to be before employers are able to shift their excess costs of health insurance to them? It would be useful to understand the trade-off made by firms between shifting costs to very small groups in the workplace and dis criminating in their hiring.
One means of addressing the first of these questions is to return to my earlier analysis and model the effect of the mandates on both indi vidual and firm average wages. If the earlier findings are driven by lower average wages in firms with many women of child-bearing age, then including the fraction of firm employment that is in this demo graphic group, or the average cost to the firm, should explain all of the drop in wages for this group. If there is within-workplace shifting, however, then the individual measure will still enter the model signifi cantly because there will be some explanatory power for the deviation of individual from firm average costs.
New Evidence-Individual or Workplace-Specific Shifting?
The data used for this analysis is the May Current Population Sur vey (1978) for the years 1974, 1975, 1977, and 1978 . I focus on 3 of the 23 states that passed "maternity mandates" in the 1975-1979 period: Illinois, New Jersey, and New York (the "experimental" states).20 I also use a set of "non-experimental" states designed to cap ture any regional shocks to the experimental states. For Illinois, the control states used are Ohio and Indiana; for New Jersey and New York, the controls are Connecticut, Massachusetts, and North Carolina. The data consist of observations on all individuals in these set of experPayroll Taxes, Employer Mandates, and the Labor Market 207 imental and non-experimental locations, for two years before the legis lation (1974, 1975) , and two years after the legislation (1977, 1978) .
The goal of the empirical work is to identify the effect of laws passed by certain states ("experimental states") which affected particu lar groups of individuals ("treatment group"). Identifying this effect requires controlling for any systematic shocks to the labor-market out comes of the treatment group correlated with, but not due to, the law. I do so in three ways in the estimation. First, I include year effects, to capture any national trends in the earnings of the treatment group. Sec ond, I include state effects, to control for secular earnings differences in the states that passed the laws and those that did not. Finally, I include state-by-year effects to control for state-specific shocks corre lated with the passage of these laws over this period; that is, I compare the treatment individuals in the experimental states to a set of control individuals in those same states and measure the change in relative out comes. This change is then compared to the change in relative out comes in states that did not pass maternity mandates to control for national shocks to the relative earnings of these groups. The identify ing assumption of this "differences-in-differences-in-differences" (DDD) estimator are fairly weak: it simply requires that there be no contemporaneous shock that affects the relative outcomes of the treat ment group in the same state-years as the law.
The treatment group here are those insured workers who are "at risk" for having a child, or whose health insurance covers someone who is at risk of having a child. The controls are other individuals who were directly unaffected by the law. However, the CPS (before May 1979) contained no information on health insurance coverage. I am thus unable to exactly identify the employees for whom this was a costly mandate.
I address this problem in two ways in the empirical work. First, I use women aged 20-40 as the treatment group. This group will con tain the individuals for whom the mandate was most costly. My con trol group is all individuals over 40 and single males aged 20-40. I exclude 20^K)-year-old married males, who may also be affected by the laws if their insurance covers their wives. This "treatment dummy" approach has the virtue that it is relatively "nonparametric."
Second, I use data on insurance coverage from other datasets to model the likelihood that individuals were covered by insurance and 208 Gruber the type of insurance coverage that they receive, and I assign each indi vidual a cost of the mandate based on these predictions and outside data on the cost of maternity health insurance. This approach has the advantage that I use individual variation, rather than differences across broad demographic groups, to identify the impact of the law. However, it has the disadvantage that it imposes strong parametric assumptions. If the functional form for the expected cost of the mandate is incorrect, then the demographic group dummy may be a more effective means of capturing the law's impact. Thus, in the empirical work, I rely on both the treatment group dummy and the individually parameterized cost measure.
I estimate regressions of the form: In this regression, the fixed effects control for time-series changes in wages (J32), the time-invariant characteristics of the experimental states (J33), and the time-invariant characteristics of the treatment group ((34). The second-level interactions control for changes over time in the experimental states (|35), changes over time for the treatment group nationwide (b6), and time-invariant characteristics of the treatment group in the experimental states ((37). The third-level interaction ((38) captures all variation in wages specific to the treatments (relative to controls), in the experimental states (relative to the non-experimentals), and in the years after the law (relative to before the law). This is the DDD estimate of the extent of shifting of the cost of the mandate to group-specific wages. The set of demographic covariates used includes years of education, experience and its square, sex, marital sta tus, a marital status by sex interaction, a dummy for nonwhite, a con trol for union status, dummies for 15 major industries, and separate year dummies for 1974 and 1978. Table 5 presents the estimates from Eq. 4. In the first column, I show that there is a significant fall in the wages of women of childbearing age in the state that passed the mandate, relative to the control groups of single men and older workers, of 4.4 percent. This is some what larger than the average cost of the mandate for this group; I inter pret these magnitudes in more detail below. The coefficients on the demographic covariates (not reported) are of their expected signs and magnitudes. There is a 1.2 percent fall in wages for the within-state control group (the coefficient on "After»Experimental," the state-byyear effect). This finding has one of two implications: either the exper imental states, on average, saw a negative shock over this period or the effect of the mandates are "spilling over" onto the control group. These two interpretations cannot be fully distinguished within this framework, although the latter seems unlikely given the finding of full shifting to group-specific wages.
This regression is unable to disentangle whether this shifting to wages is the result of within-workplace wage adjustments or drops in average wages in firms with a high proportion of women of child-bear ing age. Unfortunately, I cannot precisely distinguish these alterna tives either because I do not have information on the firms in which these women work. However, I can use information on their occupa tion and industry to create "synthetic firms" of individuals with the same occupation/industry type. I do so by dividing the data into 15 major industries and 10 major occupations, and then calculating the fraction of workers in each cell who are 20-40-year-old women. 21 I then use this in place of the individual treatment dummy in the DDD regression framework of Eq. 4.
The results of doing so are reported in the second column of Table  5 . In fact, there is a negative coefficient on the third level interaction in this regression although it is only significant at the 13 percent level. ence and its square, sex, marital status, a marital status by sex interaction, a dummy for nonwhite, a control for union status, dummies for 15 major industries, and separate year dummies for 1974 and 1978. "After" is dummy for being after mandate; "Experimental" is dummy for being in a state that passed a mandate. In columns 1-3, "Treatment" is a dummy for being a woman between 20 and 40 years old, and "Firm treatment" is the per centage of 20^0-year-old females in the worker's industry/occupation cell, regressions exclude married men In columns 4-6, "cost" is the predicted cost of mandate for the worker, and "Firm cost" is the average predicted cost in the worker's industry/occupation cell.
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The coefficient is actually more sizeable than that from the individual treatment regression; it implies that a workplace entirely made up of 20-40-year-old females would see wages fall by almost 7 percent. In the individual regression, such a workplace would see wages fall by only 4 percent. Once again, however, this regression is unable to dis entangle whether workplace-wide shifting or within-workplace shift ing is the driving force behind this fall in wages. In order to distinguish these views, I include both the individual and industry/occupation measure in column 3. If the results are a result of workplace-wide shifting, the inclusion of the average "firm" cost should significantly weaken the individual cost coefficient. In fact, the individual DDD coefficient is roughly unchanged, while the industry/occupation DDD coefficient falls to -0.023. Thus, the results imply that it is not just drops in average wages at workplaces with many women that is driving the basic finding. The latter estimate, however, is very imprecise, and one could not reject that it was either zero or much larger than the individual DDD coefficient.
The second empirical approach discussed above was to individu ally parameterize the cost of the mandate. Gruber (1992) described the methodology for generating individual-specific predicted increases in insurance costs from the mandate. The cost averages 2 percent of wages for the treatment individuals, but it ranges up to 28 percent of wages. The cost is normalized by hours per week and by predicted wages to yield a cost as a percentage of hourly wages, which is readily interpretable in this log wage framework.22 The individually parame terized cost measure can be introduced in place of the treatment dummy in Eq. 4; to the extent that my estimate of the cost of the man date is correct, a coefficient of -1 on the third-level interaction would indicate full shifting to wages.
The results using this individual parameterization at both the indi vidual and the industry/occupation level are presented in columns 4-6 of Table 5 . For the individual cost regressions, there is a sizeable and negative coefficient that is significantly different from zero and not sig nificantly different from one. For the industry/occupation level cost measures, the coefficient is similar. When the two measures are entered together, the individual-level cost coefficient is essentially unchanged, while the industry/occupation-level cost coefficient is zero. 212 Gruber Once again, however, there is a very large standard error on the indus try/occupation-level cost.
Thus, this work provides some evidence that the shifting to wages uncovered in my earlier paper arises from within-workplace changes in the wage structure. This evidence is only preliminary, however, due both to my very rough proxy for "firms" (industry/occupation cells) and the large resulting standard errors on the estimates. In particular, these findings may only be demonstrating that the individual is a better proxy for their own firm than is their industry/occupation cell. Future work, perhaps with true firm data, could fruitfully refine these esti mates.
COMPOSITION OF LABOR SUPPLY
Another important difference between mandates and payroll taxes in practice is that mandates are often lump-sum benefits, such as with mandated health insurance, whereas payroll taxes are paid as a fraction of wages. Since mandates represent an increase in the fixed costs of employment, they will be more costly for employees working fewer hours. If employers are able to shift the cost to wages in a lump-sum fashion and if the benefit is fully valued by employees, then there will be no effect on desired hours for either employees or employers. But, if such lump-sum shifting is impossible, then a natural employer reac tion to fixed cost mandates would be to increase hours and reduce employment. This would enable the employer to reduce the cost per hour of the mandate while leaving total labor input unchanged.
There may be forces, however, working in the opposite direction. Consider the case of a health insurance mandate. Since part-time workers may be readily excluded from health insurance coverage, employers would like to replace full-time employees with their (rela tively less expensive) part-time counterparts. 23 In this case, hours would fall and employment would rise, and total labor input would remain unchanged. Furthermore, the desired supply response to these mandates from the individual perspective is for increased employment among those out of the labor force and for part-time workers to increases their hours in order to qualify for health insurance, so that both employment and hours rise. Thus, the effect on hours and employment are uncertain, even if the cost of the mandate is able to be shifted to wages on average.
Evidence on this question is provided in Gruber (1994a) and Cutler and Madrian (1996) . Gruber found that, while the cost of the "mater nity mandates" of the 1970s was fully shifted to wages on average with no effect on total labor supply, there was some compositional effect on labor supply: employment fell and hours of work rose, as would be expected under the first scenario above. This suggests that employers could not shift the cost of the mandates in a perfect lump sum manner so they adjusted on the margin using the composition of the work schedule. Cutler and Madrian showed that hours rose in those indus tries which saw the greatest rise in health care costs during the past decade, once again suggesting that employers are adjusting to these increased fixed costs using the hours margin.
Even this difference between mandates and payroll taxes, however, is not as large as it appears because payroll taxes are generally capped. For UI taxes, as noted previously, these caps can be quite low; with very low caps, payroll taxes essentially operate as lump-sum mandates. If employers can shift the proportional payroll tax cost to wages below the cap only and not to wages above the cap, then there will be no incentive to change hours for either the employer or employee. But if employers cannot, they may have to reduce wages proportionately for all workers, regardless of their position relative to the cap. In this case, there will be opposite hours of work incentives for employers and employees. Employers will see higher costs below the cap and would therefore like to increase work above the cap and reduce employment; employees will see net benefits below the cap (once again assuming full valuation) and only net taxes above it, so they would like to reduce hours and increase (below cap) employment. It would be fruitful to investigate the effect of payroll tax caps on the choice of hours vs. employment, as has been done for health insurance.
REFORMING PAYROLL TAXATION
In this section, I consider two reforms to the current system of pay roll taxation. I do not discuss alternatives to mandates because the alternative generally is simply to not have the policy. In the final sec tion, I return to the overall question of whether such policies should exist and be financed through employers.
Financing Social Security and Disability Insurance Through the Income Tax
A natural alternative to financing social insurance programs through payroll taxation is to finance them through general revenues. In this section, I contrast the economic effects of payroll taxes with those of one form of general revenue raising, the individual income tax.24 In doing so, I hold the benefits side of these programs constant. For example, I assume that the Social Security benefits paid to retired workers remain a function of their lifetime work experience in the same way that they are under earmarked payroll taxation. In terms of efficiency, this implies that the tax/benefit linkage-induced shift in labor supply previously discussed will remain under income taxationthat is, so long as benefits are calculated based on past earnings histo ries, regardless of the source of financing, tax/benefit linkages will operate. Once again, the key in Summers' (1989) analysis is not the form of revenue raising, but that benefits are restricted to be a function of work effort.
In terms of equity, this approach means that I am not considering the net equity implication of these programs as a whole, but rather only the differential impact of alternative sources of finance. For example, the SS program as a whole may be progressive, even as the tax that finances this program is regressive. In this case, moving to more equi table income taxation would be a further increase in progressivity.
Efficiency. The deadweight loss from financing a social insurance program from two alternative revenue sources is a function of two fac tors: the breadth and the elasticity of the relative tax bases. The distor tion of raising a given amount of revenue will be smaller as the tax base is more inelastic. At the same time, if a tax base is small, the tax rate must be higher to raise the requisite funds; because the deadweight loss from a tax rises as the square of the tax rate, a higher rate will lead to a higher distortion. Thus, for a given level of elasticity, the dead weight loss will also fall as the tax base is more broad.
Income taxes offer a potentially much larger tax base than payroll taxation because of the inclusion of unearned income and the fact that payroll taxes are capped while income taxes include all wage and sal ary income. However, this simple intuition is rendered incorrect by the nature of the income tax system in the United States. The income tax base has a large number of exclusions (such as those for dependents, charitable giving, and mortgage payments) that make it a very incom plete measure of total income in the United States.
The base for income taxation, total taxable income, is reported by Internal Revenue Service. I use data from the Treasury Department's Individual Tax Model, along with the NBER's TAXSIM program, to measure the base of taxable payroll below the Social Security maxi mum. This data provides information on the tax returns for a large sample of taxpayers, and TAXSIM calculates the tax rates paid by those taxpayers.25 I use data from 1989, the last year for which data are available.
The total taxable income base was $2.173 trillion in 1989. In con trast, the taxable base of wage and salary earnings below the taxable maximum was only $12.9 million smaller, which is trivial relative to the size of the social insurance programs under discussion. Thus, the relative sizes of these tax bases are virtually equal. Capped earnings may be a smaller base for taxation compared with a comprehensive income definition, but capped earnings provide a base of roughly the same size compared with income taxation as it is carried out in the United States.
Furthermore, the elasticity of the income tax base is almost cer tainly higher than the elasticity of the payroll tax base. As noted ear lier, although controversial, the empirical literature on labor supply suggests that the labor supply of prime age males is fairly inelastic and that the labor supply of secondary earners is somewhat more elastic. On the other hand, other forms of income taxed under the personal income tax (e.g., capital gains) appear to be much more elastic with respect to taxation, although this evidence is also controversial (Auerbach 1988) . Similarly, charitable deductions, which lower the taxable 216 Gruber income base, are also very sensitive to tax rates (Clotfelter 1990) . Recent evidence also suggests that overall taxable income is more elas tic with respect to the tax rate than is labor income alone (Feldstein 1993; Navratil 1994) .26
Thus, it seems clear that income taxation would be a more ineffi cient source of revenue raising than payroll taxation: the size of the tax base would be no larger, and the tax base would be more elastic.
Equity. The other important consideration for examining income versus payroll taxation is the distribution of the tax burden across tax payers. A standard criticism of payroll taxation, relative to broader income taxation, is that it is less equitable. This criticism is true for two reasons. First, unearned income is distributed in a much more prorich fashion than earned income so that a tax on all income is more progressive by definition. Second, payroll taxation is capped, so that high-income individuals escape this tax burden on income above the cap. In order to contrast the equity of payroll and income taxation, I compare the effective tax rates paid by taxpayers of different income, once again using data from the Treasury model and TAXSIM. Follow ing the evidence provided above, I assume that all of the tax is borne by workers in the form of lower wages. The base for my definition of income is "total positive income"-the sum of the positive income ele ments reported on tax returns, with negative elements being set to zero. This approach is taken to avoid the problem that much of the negative income reported on tax forms is tax shelter activity, rather than true economic losses.
The left side of Table 6 compares the distribution of effective tax rates across income groups under the current system for the income tax, the payroll tax, and the combination of the two. As expected, the income tax is found to be much more progressive than the payroll tax. For the bottom 5-10 percent of taxpayers, the effective income tax rate is actually negative due to the presence of the Earned Income Tax Credit, which subsidizes labor supply for low earners. The average rate then rises gradually, reaching a maximum of 17.4 percent for the top 5 percent of taxpayers.
In contrast, the effective payroll tax rate is virtually flat for the bot tom 80 percent of taxpayers. Note that for this group, payroll taxation Payroll Taxes, Employer Mandates, and the Labor Market 217 represents the majority of their tax bill. For the top 20 percent of tax payers, payroll tax rates actually decline. Payroll taxes are therefore much less equitable than income taxes, and this becomes a key equity consideration when payroll taxes represent the majority of taxes paid for such a high fraction of taxpayers. Thus, the consideration of pay roll vs. income taxation comes down to the classic trade-off between efficiency and equity. Of course, this discussion has taken the structure of income and payroll taxes as given. If the income tax base were widened, for exam ple, by the removal or limitation of the deduction for mortgage interest, the attractiveness of income taxation would rise for three reasons. First, the tax base would be larger, so that there would be a lower effi ciency cost per dollar of revenue raised. Second, the income tax base would be less elastic. The increased elasticity of income taxation rela tive to payroll taxation described above derives largely from the fact that, under the income tax, there are a number of ways to protect income from taxation, such as the mortgage interest deduction. Limit ing these exclusions would reduce the extent to which reported income 218 Gruber can be lowered in response to higher taxes and thus limit the efficiency cost of income taxation. Finally, income taxes would become even more equitable in many cases. This is because any deduction from tax able income is regressive because tax rates rise with income. Thus, removing the mortgage interest deduction would make the income tax system more progressive.27
Raising the Taxable Maximum for Payroll Taxation
An alternative to shifting to income taxation would be to change the structure of payroll taxation to make it more equitable. A natural means for doing so would be to remove the cap on taxable earnings for SS and DI, which was removed for Medicare beginning in 1994. Under the principle of maintaining some tax/benefit linkages, if bene fits are not going to be paid based on earnings above this level, then taxes must be limited as well. However, the tax/benefit linkages are likely to be small for this top group of earners because the benefits for mula used by SS only converts each dollar of earnings to 15 cents of benefits at the top of the earnings distribution.
The efficiency consequences of uncapping the payroll tax are mixed. On one hand, it substantially increases the payroll tax base. If all wage and salary income were subject to the payroll tax, the tax base would rise from $2.16 trillion to $2.61 trillion (based on calculations using the Treasury data and TAXSIM), an increase in the tax base of over 20 percent. In 1989, the total tax rate used to finance SS and DI was 12.12 percent. If the same revenues were raised by an uncapped tax, this combined tax rate could have been reduced to 10.03 percent. Using the rule that the efficiency cost of a tax rises with the square of the tax rate, the efficiency cost of financing these programs could have been reduced by 32 percent by extending the tax base to all wages and salaries.
On the other hand, the wage and salary income of top earners may be more elastic than that of earners lower down the income distribu tion. High-income individuals receive more fringe benefits and other diverse sources of compensation, allowing for more discretion in the form in which compensation is paid. For example, if the payroll tax were uncapped, executives might switch from cash compensation to stock options. While other workers have some opportunity for this type of arbitrage using fringe benefits such as health insurance, the opportunities are more abundant for top earners. Feenberg and Poterba (1993) documented that wage and salary income for the top 1 percent of taxpayers rose dramatically after the Tax Reform Act of 1986 low ered marginal tax rates on earned income. And Navratil (1994) also found that the wage and salary income of top earners (more than $50,000 per year in 1980 dollars) is much more elastic with respect to tax changes than is that of all earners.
Furthermore, to the extent that high wage earners reduce their reported earnings in order to avoid increased payroll taxation, there is a spillover into the revenues collected under the ordinary income tax. Since the marginal income tax rate on top earners is over three times as high as the marginal payroll tax rate would be, reduced earnings by top earners could quickly mitigate any potential gains from extending the payroll tax. Navratil (1994) estimated an elasticity of earned income with respect to payroll taxation for high-income earners of approximately one. One can use this estimate, along with information on the revenues collected from both the payroll and income taxes, to estimate the reve nue effect of uncapping the payroll tax. In fact, the net revenue increase from uncapping the payroll tax would only be $11.7 billion, or 21 percent of what would be assumed based on naive application of the 12 percent payroll tax to the incremental $450 billion in revenues because the tax would raise only $43.2 billion in payroll tax revenues but would cost $31.5 billion in income tax revenues. 28 This policy could therefore have a relatively high efficiency cost per dollar of reve nues raised. Table 6 explores the equity implications of uncapping the tax base by presenting the payroll and total tax burdens, by income class, under the current system and with the tax base uncapped. There is no effect of this policy on the bottom 90 percent of the income distribution. However, there is a large net increase in taxes paid for the wealthiest taxpayers; the top 5 percent would experience and increase in their effective tax rate of approximately 20 percent. Thus, uncapping the SS tax may raise a relatively small amount of revenues, but it would sub stantially raise taxes on the very upper end of the distribution of earn ings. 220 Gruber Uncapping payroll taxes for UI would have larger effects since, as documented in Table 3 , the current taxable maximums are so low. It is difficult to replicate the calculation performed above for uncapping UI taxes, however, because we do not have a good estimate of the elastic ity of earned income for lower wage earners, nor is there readily avail able data on the marginal UI tax rate faced by workers at different income levels. Undertaking this kind of calculation could be useful for assessing the implications of uncapping UI taxes as well.
CONCLUSIONS
This chapter has tried to highlight what we know and what we don't know about the labor-market effects of payroll taxation and employer mandates in the United States. While recent evidence sug gests that mandates and payroll taxes are fully shifted to workers' wages with little disemployment effect, there remains important ques tions and complications that must be explored by future research. In addition, I discuss the benefits and costs of shifting from payroll taxa tion to income taxation, as well as of uncapping the payroll tax.
There is a larger question avoided by this discussion: should pay roll tax financed and mandated employer benefits exist at all? There are three components to the welfare analysis of social insurance inter ventions: the deadweight loss from financing, other distortions to behavior from the existence of public insurance, and the benefits for the party on whose behalf the intervention is occurring. This chapter has focused on the first of these components. There is also a large liter ature on the second, which has explored the distortive effects of the perverse incentives inherent in a number of different social insurance programs. However, there is little work on the third area-the benefits of social insurance interventions. Without evidence on this front, we cannot conclude as to the optimal level of government intervention in private insurance markets.
Consider the case of workers' compensation. Gruber and Krueger (1991) showed that there is little deadweight loss from financing this program. Meyer (1990) and Krueger (1990 Krueger ( , 1992 showed that there are important distortions to worker injury reports and duration of job absence, but there is little evidence on the benefits of WC. To what extent does WC reduce the deadweight loss that would otherwise be incurred through the tort system as workers and firms tried to resolve workplace injury cases? To what extent does it smooth the consump tion of myopic or liquidity constrained workers who would otherwise see a large drop in their standard of living when they were truly injured on the job? Until these benefits are measured, we have no way of assessing the optimal level of government intervention in this market; how else can we assess whether the distortions measured by the earlier work are "large"?
Similar problems exist in evaluating the optimal level of the Social Security program. In this case, we don't necessarily even know the deadweight loss from financing. There are a number of reasons, noted previously, why the results from previous incidence research may not apply to Social Security. Once again, there is a long line of research on the distortive effects of the program to savings and retirement behavior by Feldstein (1974) , Burtless (1986) , and Diamond and Hausman (1984) . In this case, however, there is also only sketchy evidence on the benefits of the program. There has been some attention paid to issues of benefit adequacy; see Diamond (1977) , Kotlikoff, Spivak, and Summers (1982) , and Hamermesh (1984) for somewhat different con clusions on this adequacy issue. None of these studies, however, has been able to assess convincingly the effects of varying Social Security benefits on the welfare of retirees because they have not been able to fully model the alternative consumption smoothing opportunities avail able to the retiree in the absence of Social Security. Feldstein (1985) conjectured on the optimal Social Security benefit level using a model where some fraction of the population is myopic and concluded that the optimal program should be quite small. This work could be use fully extended by incorporating liquidity constraints and other capital market failures into the model and, more convincingly, by providing empirical evidence on how the living standards of the elderly change as Social Security benefits vary.
Perhaps the most complete picture can be painted for unemploy ment insurance. The evidence in Anderson and Meyer (1997) suggests that there is little deadweight loss at the market level from the financing of UI, although there may be a distortion at the firm level. Meyer (1990) showed that there is a large distortion of generous UI benefits to 222 Gruber unemployment durations, and Feldstein (1978) , Topel (1983) , and Anderson and Meyer (1994) showed that there are also distortions of imperfect experience rating to firm layoff decisions. On the other hand, there are two forms of benefit of this program for individual workers. The first is that it helps to subsidize efficient search by liquidity con strained unemployed workers. But recent research has shown that the longer search induced by more generous unemployment insurance ben efits does not result in better job matches, as measured by the ultimate wage received (Meyer 1989; Woodbury and Speigelman 1987) . The second is that it smooths the consumption of individuals who, due either to myopia or some capital market failure, are unable to smooth their own consumption during unemployment spells. 29 Some prelimi nary evidence on this front is provided by Gruber (1997 Gruber ( , 1998 , who found that the consumption of those becoming unemployed falls signif icantly more if there is less generous UI. In that paper, I attempted to use a simple optimal benefits model to compare the costs and benefits of UI into a simple optimal benefits model, but there is clearly room for more systematic incorporation of the costs and benefits of social insur ance programs in order to assess optimal intervention levels.
Notes
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1. The description of these programs is current as of 1993. Most information is from Committee on Ways and Means (1993) and Employee Benefits Research Institute (1992). 2. The normal age of retirement under Social Security is 65. Individuals can retire as early as age 62, but benefits are then adjusted downwards to reflect the fact that they are received for a larger number of years. Similarly, individuals can retire after age 65, and benefits are adjusted upwards, through a "delayed retirement credit." If individuals wish to both continue working and receive benefits, they can do so, but benefits are taxed away at a rate of $1 of benefit for every $3 of earnings [above some minimum threshold ($10,560)]; this is known as the "earn ings test." 3. Although, for past cohorts, the system actually redistributed (in total dollar terms) towards higher income workers; see Stuerle and Bakija (1994) for an overview. This trend is projected to end for future generations, as the program becomes more progressive. 4. The problems in defining disability for the purposes of Disability Insurance are well known; see Parsons (1991) for a detailed discussion of these issues 5. While this is primarily a state-run program, employers are obligated to pay a 0 6 percent payroll tax to the federal government (FUTA tax). 6. It is difficult to decide where "mandates" end and other workplace regulations begin. The dividing line chosen here is that mandates are government regulations of the provision of employee benefits; thus, particular regulations pertaining to health insurance benefit plans are mandates, while workplace antidiscrimination rules are not. It remains unclear whether government regulations of workplace safety should be counted as a mandate in this context 7. Continuation of coverage benefits provide that the employee can continue to pur chase health insurance from the firm at the average group rate following his or her voluntary or involuntary termination. See Gruber and Madrian (1993) for more details on these laws. 8. Workers' compensation is not mandatory in New Jersey, South Carolina, and
Texas. See Deere (1994) for an analysis of the implications of voluntary workers' compensation in Texas. 9. These are the "manual rates," which provide the basis for firm insurance pay ments. The actual cost of insurance may differ from these rates for some firms due to within-industry experience rating; see Burton et al. (1985) for details. 10. One may wonder why, if this program is fully valued by workers, a government mandate is required. As Summers (1989) discusses, a variety of different market failures (such as adverse selection in the choice to insure) may make it difficult for these type of arrangements to emerge in the free market even if there is full valua tion; government intervention may improve welfare in this case. 11. A third alternative for full shifting to wages would be perfectly elastic demand, but this would imply much larger disemployment effects than those found by Gru ber and Krueger (1991) . 12. The variation in payroll costs in Gruber and Krueger (1991) is over a 10-year period; for Anderson and Meyer (1997) , there is a 6-year window. 13. Whether this assumption of money illusion is warranted, of course, is the subject of a large macroeconomics literature not addressed here. 14. Vergara (1990) showed that, if the social welfare function values poor individuals more highly, it will in general be optimal to have some degree of public provision financed by income taxation instead of having all of the intervention financed by a mandate. 15. These findings have not been without their critics; see Neumark and Wascher (1992) , and the debate between Neumark and Wascher (1994) and Card, Krueger, and Katz (1994) . 16. For example, the costs of unemployment insurance are roughly equal across all workers, unless some workers are "layoff-prone." 17 Even if the costs can be shifted on average, however, if there is not perfect lumpsum shifting, there will still be a distortion to the hours margin which may spill over to other groups. This is discussed further below. 18. See Ehrenberg and Smith (1987) for a discussion of U.S. antidiscrimination legis lation, which was in place well before the mid 1970s In this discussion, I focus only on laws prohibiting discrimination in rates of pay and/or promotion. In fact, if there are also binding restrictions on relative hiring practices, then employers may be forced to bear the cost of the mandate. If discrimination rules are only binding on the hiring side, then they will not impede group-specific shifting in the case of full valuation. 19. These findings highlight another margin of employer response not emphasized here: reducing other (nonmandated) benefits when there are increases in man dated benefits. This margin has the advantage that existing benefits are often lump sum, so that they provide a natural means of offsetting new lump-sum costs imposed on employers. 20. In Gruber (1994a) , I discuss the motivation for my choice of these states as well as a large range of empirical issues that are mentioned only briefly here. 21. The results are similar if I use other methods of creating synthetic firms. This approach allows for a relatively fine division of the data without creating many cells which have just a few women. 22. The pros and cons of this approach, as well as the robustness of the results to functional form, are discussed in Gruber (1992) . 23 Under the Employee Retirement and Income Security Act (ERISA), employers who offer health insurance must make that insurance available to any worker who works 1,000 hours per year or more. 24. Of course, there are other forms of revenue raising available to the government, such as corporate taxation or federal excise taxation. However, the taxation of individual incomes is the dominant source of revenue at the federal level, so it provides a natural point for comparison; this analysis could readily be extended to consider alternative forms of taxation. I only consider the Social Security and Disability Insurance payroll tax because the structure of the Medicare payroll tax is now fundamentally different (since there is no taxable maximum). 25 Earnings is defined as wage and salary earnings plus self-employment earnings plus farm income Where these elements are reported to be negative, I replace them with zero, under the assumption that negative earnings reflects tax shelter behavior. 26. This is true for a number of reasons, including the following-a less elastic behav ioral response of labor supply than of other forms of economic activity, more scope for relabeling other forms of income to avoid taxation than is possible with labor income (i.e., shifting from dividends to capital gains when the capital gains tax rate is lower), and more scope for evasion with other forms of income (i.e., claiming artificially high chantable contributions). 27. While the first two comments apply to the removal of any exclusion in the tax code, the last does not; some tax breaks, such as the earned income tax credit, are progressive. 28. This calculation is done as follows. Assume that the currently marginal tax rate on earnings in the uncapped range is 35 percent. Uncapping the payroll tax would raise that rate to 47 percent. Navratil finds that the elasticity of earnings with respect to after-tax shares is one. Since the after-tax share is reduced by 20 perPayroll Taxes, Employer Mandates, and the Labor Market 225 cent, this would mean that the additional $450 billion in earnings in the uncapped range would be reduced to $360 billion. Thus, the uncapped payroll tax would raise an additional $43.2 billion, but income tax revenues would be reduced by $31.5 billion. 29. A third traditional justification for UI is that it serves as an automatic stabilizer, reducing the seventy of recessions by redistributing from good times to bad. There is little direct evidence on the automatic stabilization properties of UI. A finding that UI smooths consumption at the level of the individual, discussed below, may provide indirect evidence on its success as an automatic stabilizer.
